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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY

A.

The District Court Violated Mr. Transue's Right To Procedural Due Process As
Protected By The Fourteenth Amendment By Finding No "Sufficient Reason" For
Raising His Claims In A Successive Petition Under I.C. § 19-4908
In Mr. Transue's first post-conviction relief case, his appointed counsel filed an amended

petition that neither included Mr. Transue's verification, incorporated Mr. Transue's initial
petition nor attached any affidavits. R. 24, 55-66, 68-72, 74. The district court advised counsel of
the deficiency at a hearing at which Mr. Transue was not present. R. 23. And while counsel
referenced some affidavit at the hearing, the district court found no affidavit had been filed
before or subsequent to the hearing. R. 25-26, 75-76.
The district court lamented: "If there was a separate affidavit, or even verified facts that
were a part of the initial Petition, the Court would consider that information for purposes of this
motion; however, there is no such information." R. 25-26, 75-76. Counsel's unverified, amended
petition superseded the initial petition and its supporting documents. R. 25, 75. The district court
thus dismissed the petition because there was "no" admissible evidence supporting his claims. R.
25-26, 75-76.
Post-conviction counsel placed Mr. Transue in a worse position than self-representation
and caused his sole opportunity to vindicate important constitutional rights to be dismissed
without consideration of their merits. Certainly these circumstances - where Mr. Transue did
not even sign the fatally flawed amended petition -

should constitute a "sufficient reason" for

inadequately presenting the claims in the prior action and allow him to re-litigate those claims in
a successive action.
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Nevertheless, relying on Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 327 P.3d 365 (2014), the district
court dismissed Mr. Transue's post-conviction relief claims as barred by LC. § 19-4908.
However, in Murphy, this Court reasoned that the absence of a constitutional right to an attorney
in state post-conviction proceedings precludes claims of ineffective assistance of post-conviction
counsel as a ground for relief in a successive action. Murphy thus reasoned that ineffective
assistance of post-conviction counsel cannot demonstrate sufficient reason for filing a successive
petition under LC. § 19-4908. Johnson v. State, 162 Idaho 213, 227, 395 P.3d 1246, 1260 (2017);

Murphy, 156 Idaho at 395, 327 P.3d at 371.
Murphy did not designate post-conviction counsel's conduct taboo to the analysis of
whether there is sufficient reason to justify a successive petition. Instead, under Murphy, a
petitioner cannot establish a "sufficient reason" under LC. § 19-4908 by proving post-conviction
counsel's representation was ineffective under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

Murphy was intended to curb an endless stream of meritless post-conviction actions, not create
"Kafkaesque" labyrinth" noted by Judge Schwartzman "in which a hapless litigant can't even
find the right door to get into court." Schultz v. State, 159 Idaho 486, 490, 362 P.3d 561, 565 (Ct.
App. 2015)
Here, Mr. Transue did much more than show ineffective assistance of post-conviction
counsel. Indeed, Mr. Transue established an utter absence of meaningful representation, which
directly cause his action to be dismissed based on an easily remedied procedural defect. He also
established the district court's error in adhering to substance over form.
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In response, the state summarily claims Mr. Transue "has not shown, in the holding of
Murphy or in any subsequent decision applying its holding, any basis for distinguishing

ineffective assistance of counsel at the summary dismissal stage from ineffective assistance at the
evidentiary hearing stage for purposes of the successive petition bar." Respondent's Brief, p. 6.
The state fails to specifically address Mr. Transue's arguments, encompassing ten pages, which
outline several reasons for distinguishing the conduct of Mr. Transue's post-conviction attorney
and the case's procedural history from those at issue in Murphy. Appellant's Brief, p. 7-17.
Accordingly, no further reply is required.

B.

This Court Must Remand for an Evidentiary Hearing Because Mr. Transue
Established Factual Issues Precluding Summary Dismissal
Mr. Transue's trial counsel provided objectively unreasonable advice regarding the Rule

11 and unreasonably failed to object to fundamental error that deprived Mr. Transue of his Sixth

and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair trial. In failing to raise the due process violations on
direct appeal, appellate counsel's performance was similarly deficient. Counsel's deficient
performance, Mr. Transue's involuntary statements during the plea colloquy and state's breach of
the plea agreement all deprived Mr. Transue of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a
fair trial. The district court thus erred in dismissing Mr. Transue's post-conviction relief petition
and this Court should remand for an evidentiary hearing.
According to the state, it is "unclear" why Mr. Transue's opening brief addressed the
merits of his post-conviction claims related to the criminal trial or pre-trial proceedings because
the district court dismissed those claims "only on the basis that they were successive."
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Respondent's Brief p. 5, n.1. Mr. Transue agrees that this Court should remand the matter to the
district court and that he is entitled to notice and an opportunity to address any deficiencies in his
claims, other than ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, under I. C. § 19-4906(b).
However, in a different context, this Court has found that failure to give proper notice did
not require remand where the petitioner failed to provide admissible evidence. Ridgley v. State,
148 Idaho 671, 676, 227 P.3d 925, 930 (2010). Mr. Transue addressed the admissible evidence to
support his claims, dismissed pursuant to LC. § 19-4908, in the event this Court considers the
merits of Mr. Transue's claims in determining whether to remand to the district court.
The state's reluctance to address Mr. Transue's underlying claims is telling and should be
considered a concession that Mr. Transue presented sufficient evidence to survive summary
dismissal. Moreover, that Mr. Transue' s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel is
"substantial" is relevant to the issue of procedural default under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Martinez

v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 18, (2012).
And Mr. Transue must at least attempt a fair presentation of his issues to Idaho's highest
court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b ), even if Idaho prefers to forgo AEDPA deference and continue
delegating the disgraceful condition of our state's indigent representation to the federal courts.

See Johnson, 162 Idaho at 228, 395 P.3d at 1261 (acknowledging the federal courts "will have
to" address claims foreclosed by Murphy on their merits).
Mr. Transue established an issue of fact as to whether trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This case must
be remanded for an evidentiary hearing.
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C.

The District Court Erred In Dismissing Mr. Transue's Petition For Post-Conviction
Relief Because He Established Ineffective Assistance Of Appellate Counsel
As argued in Mr. Transue's opening brief, the district court erred in overruling Mr.

Transue's foundational objection to the expert's opinion that sexual abuse occurred and, given
the weight the jury would have assigned to such testimony, its admission could not be considered
harmless. See State v. Konechny, 134 Idaho 410, 418, 3 P.3d 535, 543 (Ct. App. 2000). Had
appellate counsel raised the objection on direct appeal, the appellate court would have vacated
the lewd conduct convictions. Mr. Transue therefore established that he received ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel and the district court erred in dismissing his post-conviction relief
petition.
In response, the state claims Mr. Transue's argument is raised for the first time on appeal
because his amended petition raised six question regarding the victims' veracity and did not
specifically cite Idaho Rule of Evidence 702. Respondent's Brief p. 9-10. However, trial counsel
objected on the basis of foundation, thereby asserting the evidence was not admissible under the
rules of evidence. Rule 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony.
Moreover, Mr. Transue's amended petition did cite to State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 692,
760 P.2d 27, 31 (1988) for the proposition that an expert's opinion is inadmissible when it
depends on the child's veracity. R. 205-206. Hester addressed the admissibility of expert
testimony in child abuse cases under Rule 702. Hester, 114 Idaho 692-696, 760 P.2d 31-35. Mr.
Transue's opening brief relies on the same line of cases Mr. Transue cited to the district court,
which address the admissibility of expert testimony. Mr. Transue's petition sufficiently preserved
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the issue by citing the relevant facts and case law and specific citation to the rule was not
required.
The state also claims Mr. Transue did not make a prima facie showing of ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel because he did not present evidence regarding the reasons his
attorney failed to raise a reversible error on appeal. While weeding out weaker issues is a
hallmark of effective appellate advocacy, petitioner's can overcome the presumption of effective
assistance of counsel when ignored issues are clearly stronger than those presented. Thompson v.

State, 164 Idaho 821, 831, 436 P.3d 642, 652 (2019).
It is unclear what tactical advantage could be gained by failing to raise reversible error on
appeal. In a jury trial, counsel could reasonably decide to forgo an objection so as to remain free
to make certain arguments to the jury that an omitted instruction would have precluded.

See Thompson, 164 Idaho at 832,436 P.3d at 653 (Judge Stegner concurring). Appeals, on the
other hand, present legal questions and do not depend on the nebulous and emotional decisions
of jurors.
Here, appellate counsel argued the district court abused its discretion when it admitted the
CARES interviews under Rule 801(d)(l)(B) and that there was insufficient evidence to support
the sexual abuse of a minor charge. State v. Transue, No. 43777, 2017 WL 4128083, at *3 (Idaho
Ct. App. Sept. 19, 2017). While the sufficiency of the evidence argument was successful it only
addressed one of Mr. Transue's three convictions.
If a challenge to the district court's ruling on the expert testimony would have resulted in
reversal of Mr. Transue's conviction, there could be no sound strategic reason to forgo that issue
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in favor of the admissibility of the CARE's interviews. In these circumstances, Mr. Transue
established a prima facie case that appellate counsel provided deficient performance by
establishing a prima facie case of prejudice -

that the neglected issue, had it been raised, would

have prevailed. Accordingly, the district court erred in dismissing Mr. Transue's claim that he
received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

III. CONCLUSION
Post-conviction counsel and the district court allowed Mr. Transue's first post-conviction
relief action to be dismissed over a technicality, thereby depriving violating Mr. Transue's right
to due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. These circumstances complete absence of meaningful representation -

including the

are "sufficient" to justify a successive petition

and Mr. Transue presented issues of fact precluding summary dismissal and requiring an
evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, for all the reasons set forth above and in Mr. Transue's opening
brief, this Court should reverse the district court's judgment dismissing Mr. Transue's petition
and remand with instruction to grant his requested relief.
Respectfully submitted this 1st day of October, 2019.

FYFFE LAW, LLC

/s/ Robyn Fyffe
ROBYN FYFFE
Attorney for Bryce Transue
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